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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the denial of a Petition for a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. The petition was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County before Judge Leonard 
H. Russon. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower Court err in its finding that the 
plaintiff had been afforded all of the appropriate constitutional 
protection at his parole violation hearing? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§ 77-27-25(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): 
The determinations and decisions of the Board of Pardons in 
cases involving approval or denial of any action, of paroles, 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, orders of 
restitution, or remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution, 
are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in 
this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 30, 1989, the appellant filed a Petition for Writ 
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of Habeas Corpus with the Third Judicial District Court. (R. 2) 
The respondents filed an answer (R. 19), a motion to dismiss (R. 
22), and a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss (R. 
15). Counsel was appointed to represent the appellant (R. 14). 
Counsel for the appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
state's motion to dismiss (R. 24). A hearing was held before 
Judge Leonard H. Russon on May 9, 1989 (R. 36). The Court made 
findings of fact, conclusions of law (R.56) and ordered the 
petition dismissed (R. 59). Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 
(R. 61). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant appeared before the Utah State Board of Pardons on 
March 1, 1989 for a parole violation hearing. There were five 
specific allegations made. The appellant admitted two of those 
allegations, and the appellant was found to be in violation of 
his parole agreement. The board then revoked the appellant's 
parole, and he was returned to the Utah State Prison. 
The appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
primarily alleging that he had been inadequately represented by 
counsel at the parole violation hearing. The defendants 
responded, claiming that the appellant had been adequately 
afforded the appropriate constitutional rights attendant to a 
parole violation hearing and that the Court was not free to 
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review the Board of Pardons decisions. The Court held a hearing 
and dismissed the petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant fails to attack any of the specific findings 
of fact or conclusions of law made by the lower court. The 
appellant was represented by counsel at all of the proceedings in 
this case, particularly the parole revocation hearing and the 
hearing on the motion to dismiss his petition. The appellant was 
given appropriate notice of the parole revocation hearing, was 
given a chance to be heard at that hearing to contest any of the 
allegations made against him. The board's subsequent decision to 
revoke the appellant's parole is not further subject to judicial 
review, being precluded by § 77-27-5(3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE APPELLANT FAILS TO CHALLENGE ANY SPECIFIC FINDING 
OF FACT OR CONCLUSION OF LAW. 
Appellant has not attacked any of the findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. Without doing so, the appellant provides 
this Court no mechanism to reverse the lower court's ruling. 
This principle has been clarified by this Court in the case of 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 
(Ct. App. 1989). Therein the Court stated: 
In order to challenge a trial court's 
findings of fact, a party "must marshal the 
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evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of 
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" In re Bartell, 105 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3,4 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). (further citations omitted). 
Appellants often overlook or disregard this 
heavy burden. When the duty to marshal is 
not properly discharged, we refuse to 
consider the merits of challenges to the 
findings and accept the findings as valid. 
Id. at 51. 
Appellant's burden is to establish that the trial court's 
findings of fact were "clearly erroneous." The appellant has 
neither made the requisite allegation of error, nor made a 
demonstration of such before this Court. 
The Court made specific findings of fact that the appellant 
had been given adequate notice of the hearing, had been given 
adequate notice of the alleged parole violations. The Court 
found further that the appellant had appeared at the hearing at 
the appointed time, and being represented by counsel, admitted 
two of the allegations against himself. The Court found that the 
appellant had been allowed to address the board both personally, 
and through counsel. (R. 57) The Court concluded as a matter of 
law that more was not required under Utah law. In making these 
findings the Court relied somewhat upon the transcript provided 
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to the Court of the parole revocation hearing (R. 41-55). The 
Court noted in its memorandum decision: 
[0]ne placed on parole is entitled to 
certain minimal procedural protections in 
regards to issues as to whether or not his 
parole should be revoked. Brimhall v. 
Turner, 28 Utah 2d 321, 502 P.2d 116. 
In this case, petitioner had notice of the 
parole revocation hearing and the charges 
against him, the right to and utilization of 
legal counsel, and the opportunity to be 
heard. After conferring with his legal 
counsel, the petitioner admitted allegation 
two (assault) and allegation four (consuming 
alcohol). Three other allegations brought 
against the petitioner were dismissed. 
The transcript indicate a discussion 
between the Parole Board and counsel for the 
petitioner, as well as with petitioner 
personally. Petitioner was given an 
opportunity to speak. 
Memorandum Decision (R. 38). The trial Court specifically looked 
to the constitutional protections required at a parole revocation 
hearing, and made specific findings of fact that they had been 
afforded the appellant. The appellant's brief fails to address 
those specific findings of fact, and falls far short of meeting 
his burden of showing that those findings were "clearly 
erroneous." 
Since the findings of fact remain have not been assailed, 
the lower Court's conclusions of law retain their underpinnings 
as well, and need not be reviewed by this Court. The Court below 
specifically concluded that "the plaintiff was afforded with all 
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of the necessary minimal procedural protections required at his 
parole revocation hearing." (R. 58) The Court also concluded 
that there was no statutory authority to review the Board of 
Pardons' decision to revoke the appellant's parole, since that 
decision itself is singularly up to the board. 
POINT II. THE COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT IT COULD NOT REVIEW 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS' DECISION REVOKING THE APPELLANT'S PAROLE. 
The Court's first conclusion of law was that "§ 77-27-5(3) 
precludes it from reviewing the determinations and decisions of 
the Board of Pardons." (R. 57). That section provides: 
The determinations and decisions of the 
Board of Pardons in cases involving approval 
or denial of any action, of paroles, pardons, 
commutations or terminations of sentence, 
orders of restitution, or remission of fines, 
forfeitures, and restitution, are final and 
are not subject to judicial review.... 
§ 77-27-5(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
Accordingly, the Judge Russon ruled: "This Court cannot weigh 
the merits of the Parole Board's decision, since that is solely 
within its province." (Memorandum Decision, R. 39). This Court 
similarly should decline review of the Board of Pardons decision 
revoking the appellant's parole. 
POINT III. APPELLANT IMPROPERLY RAISES NEW ISSUES AND SEEKS 
REMEDIES WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE BEFORE THIS COURT. 
It is axiomatic that issues which were not raised in a lower 
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court will not be first heard on appeal (See: Bangerter v. 
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983), and that the appellate court's 
spectra of remedies does not extend past review of the lower 
court's findings, conclusions, and orders. The appellant's 
initial petition included merely a prayer for a determination 
that his incarceration was unlawful and illegal based upon the 
claimed errors at his parole violation hearing. (R. 3). The 
appellant's brief, however, makes a number of specific requests 
which are not before this Court. For example, the appellant 
requests an autopsy report, police reports, tax records, 
injunctive relief, damages, and a declaration of mistrial on his 
original conviction. All of these requests are well beyond the 
scope of the original writ and outside the bounds of what this 
Court may now consider. The Court is therefore respectfully 
urged to deny these request as not being properly presented. 
SUMMARY 
The appeal must fail for a couple of reasons. First of all, 
the appellant has failed to specifically challenge any finding of 
fact or conclusion of law upon which the order was based. The 
original petition was merely an effort to get the District Court 
to reverse the Parole Board's decision to revoke the petitioner's 
parole. The lower Court properly concluded that it should not. 
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The remaining requests of the appellant are not properly before 
the Court and ought to be denied. 
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